NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 8 | Number 4

Article 19

6-1-1930

Criminal Law -- Suspended Sentence -Banishment as Condition
W. T. Covington Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
W. T. Covington Jr., Criminal Law -- Suspended Sentence -- Banishment as Condition, 8 N.C. L. Rev. 465 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol8/iss4/19

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.
Criminal Law-Suspended Sentence-Banishment as Condition
The feme defendant, convicted in the Superior Court of violating
the prohibition laws, was sentenced to two years imprisonment, capias
to issue at the discretion of the solicitor, if at the end of sixty days
the defendant was found within the state. The defendant left the
state within the sixty days, but, four years after her conviction and
two years after her return to the state, on a motion of the solicitor,
while she awaited trial on another prohibition charge, the sentence
was ordered under the previous judgment. Both the judgment' and
the order 2 were affirmed on appeal.
It is suggested in a Tennessee decisions that the suspended sentence having developed in England as an aid to substantial justice in
lieu of criminal appeals, it is now properly employed only as an incident of procedure. An appellate court, however, cannot grant reprieve to a guilty prisoner, and trial courts have found this a desirable
4
method of meeting frequently occurring situations.
Definite probation systems have been adopted by thirty-three
states 5 in which the use of the suspended sentence is directed to the
end of achieving the reformation of certain offenders, but, in North
Carolina, due to the absence of any law6 regulating its use the trial
judge7 may use his own discretion as to whether the circumstances
'Except the provision that the capias was to issue at the discretion of the
solicitor, which was held to be without authority, the power to issue the capias
remaining in the court. State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320, 127 S. E. 204 (1925).
'State v. McAfee, 198 N. C. 507, 152 S. E. 391 (1930).
'A Tennessee court has no power to suspend sentence as a reformatory
measure. Spencer v. State, 125 Tenn. 64, 140 S. W. 597, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
680 (1911).
' Under extenuating circumstances, especially in the case of young and first
offenders, the interests of society and the offender are often best served not by
exacting the prescribed penalty, but by granting conditional freedom.
'In thirty-two states probation laws apply to both adults and children; in
fifteen states -there are juvenile probation laws only; Wyoming has only adult
probation. National Directory of Probation Officers, The National Probation
Ass'n (1928).
A Pennsylvania act of June 19, 1911, provides that a court may suspend
sentence when the prisoner has not been previously imprisoned, when his
character and the circumstances are such as to make a recurrence of the
offense unlikely, and when no duty to protect society is violated thereby, and
that a convict on probation may be dismissed when he has met the conditions.
The Report of the Crimes Survey Committee, The Law Ass'n of Philadelphia
(1926).
' Public policy would probably prohibit its use in the case of the graver
offenses.
'The sentence may be suspended by a Justice of the Peace, State v. Grims,
117 N. C. 709, 23 S. E. 164 (1895) ; a municipal judge, State v. Greer, 173
N. C. 759, 92 S. E. 147 (1917) ; or a recorder, State v. Tripp, 168 N. C. 150,
83 S.E. 630 (1914).
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warrant a reprieve,8 he may suspend sentence indefinitely, 9 and he
may impose conditions' o limited only by the court's conscience and
imagination. Although a sentence of banishment is void, a sentence
suspended on condition that the defendant leave the state and never
return has been upheld on the grounds that the exile was voluntary."1
By this reasoning it is obvious that any condition may be adjudged
legal, and the prisoner may be confronted with unusual and cruel
alternatives 12 to the prescribed punishment. It is further left to the
discretion of the court whether a given act amounts to a breach of
the condition,13 and, if so, whether the promised punishment will be
4
imposed.'
' There are no statutory regulations, and the circumstances under which the
reprieve was granted do not appear in the opinions of the Supreme Court, but
sentence has been suspended where offenders were guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon, State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) ; operating a disorderly house, State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892) ;,
libel, State v. Sanders, 153 N. C. 624, 69 S.E. 272 (1910) ; trespass to land;
State v. Griffis, supra note 7.
'The cases cited in note 8, supra, illustrate situations in which the sentence
may be executed whenever the conditions are breached (Some courts hold that
sentence may not be suspended indefinitely. Ex parte Bugg, 163 Mo. App. 44,
145 S.W. 831 [1912].), but the court sometimes stipulates a definite.period for
performance, as where the defendant was required to show for two years that
he had not violated the prohibition laws, State v. Greer, supra note 7.
10 Sentence is most frequently suspended on condition of good hehavior,
State v. Everett, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S.E. 274, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848 (1913),
but sentences have been suspended on condition that the prisoner leave the
county and never return, Ex parte Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E. 310, 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 352 (1911), that he pay the costs, State v. Griffis, supra note
7, that he pay the costs for himself and another, State v. Crook, 115 N. C.
760, 20 S.E. 513, 29 L. R. A. 260 (1894), that he keep the peace and not libel
certain persons, State v. Sanders, supra note 8, that he show compliance with
the prohibition laws for two years, State v. Greer, supranote 7. For comments
upon North Carolina cases, see (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 116 and (1928) 6 N. C.
L. R-v. 327.
' State v. Hatley, supra note 8. There would seem to be some doubt
whether leaving and remaining out of the state could be called strictly voluntary, when the only other course open to the prisoner is a term in jail. The
South Carolina court takes this view in State v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E.
501 (1900), where imprisonment was to be for five years if the convict left
the state immediately thereafter, if riot Jor two additional years, the court
holding the condition involved perpetual banishment, and was therefore void:
A condition in a sentence that the offender leave the county was held void in
Hoggett v. State, 101 Miss. 269, 57 So. 811 (1912), but the Arkansas court
holds that a governor may pardon on such a condition, Ex parte Hawkins, 61
Ark., 321, 33 S.W. 106, 30 L. R. A. 736, 54 Am. St. Rep. 209 (1895).
"A suspended sentence is not an alternative judgment, State v. Hatley,
supra note 8, but it does offer a practical alternative to the prisoner.
':State v. Hoggard, 180 N. C. 678, 103 S.E. 891 (1920).
" In State v. Sanders, supra note 8, the court remarks on the fact that
capias did not issue on an unequivocal breach of condition, and in the instant
case the defendant operated a shop a few blocks from the court house for two
years in open violation of the condition that she remain out of the state.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Supreme Court, while recognizing the legality of suspending
sentence, has not commended the practice, 15 but has indicated that
evils would result from its indiscriminate use.16 With the law governing the suspended sentence in its present state there is no assurance
either to the community or to the convicted that under given circumstances sentence will be suspended, or on what conditions, or for what
period, or that on a breach of condition the offender will be disciplined. The instant case suggests the need of a definite system of
regulations designed to carry out the purpose of the suspended sentence, and to minimize the likelihood of its abuse.

W. T. COVINGTON, JR.
Damages-Carriers-Measure of Damages for Loss of Small
Part of Shipment in Bulk
In a recent case the facts showed that the plaintiff purchased a
carload of coal, while in transit. On arrival at destination there was
a shortage of 5,500 pounds. At the time of arrival, plaintiff had not
sold any of the coal. The shortage did not interfere with the maintenance of his usual stock, and no sales were lost as a result of it.
The plaintiff did not go into the retail market to replace the shortage.
Held, that the measure of damages was the wholesale price.1
It is the avowed aim of the courts in actions founded on contract
to place the party injured in as good position pecuniarily as he would
have occupied had the breach not occurred,2 and damages are
awarded, in the absence of special circumstances with this principle
in mind.
The pertinent statutory expression is found in the so-called Cummins Act 3 which provides that the holder of a bill of lading for interstate rail shipment is entitled to recover for the "full actual loss" to
his property. By jfudicial interpretation this has come to mean that
such loss is to be ascertained with reference to the value at point of
destination. 4
'

State v. Hatley, supra note 8.

"State v. Griffis, supra note 7; State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S.E.

1011 (1909) ; State v. Everett, supra note .10.
'Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crail, 50 Sup. Ct. 180 (1930).
'Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. U. S., 261 U. S.299, 43 Sup. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed.

664 (1922).

'34 Stat. 593, 49 U. S. C. A. §20 (11).
"Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore

504, 64 L. ed. 801 (1919).

Co., 253 U. S.97, 40 Sup. Ct.

